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Note

The Habitual Criminal Act:
Quantity of Convictions Only?
State v. Pierce, 204 Neb. 433, 283 N.W.2d 6 (1979)
I. INTRODUCTION
Virtually every jurisdiction in the United States has enacted
some form of habitual offender law providing for enhancement of
the penalty for the repetition of criminal conduct by an individual
with a prior conviction or prior convictions.1 Habitual criminal
statutes, in general, are manifestations of society's. attempts to
deal with the problems of criminal recidivism. Such statutes are
intended to deter potential recidivists, protect society from persistent offenders who have not been deterred by prior punishment,
rehabilitate persistent offenders, and provide retribution.2 In view
1. S. RUBIN, LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 452 (2d ed. 1973); Katkin, Habitual

Offender Laws: A Reconsideration,21 BuFFALo L. REV. 99, 104 (1971). For a
brief survey of habitual offender laws in the United States, see AMERicAN BAR
ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES, SEN-

TENCING COMPUTATION LAWS AND PRACTICE (1974) [hereinafter cited as ABA
SENTENCING].
2. See, e.g., Note, Recidivist Procedures,40 N.Y.U. L REV. 332, 349-50 (1965):
Increased recidivist penalties serve to separate from society, for a
longer period of time, persons who have shown themselves to be incorrigibly anti-social. By providing stiffer penalties for multiple offenders, society may deter those who have already been convicted of
crime from the commission of further criminal acts. If penal sanctions are regarded as rehabilitative, a larger dose of rehabilitation for
multiple offenders is indicated by the fact that previous rehabilitation in normal measure was not sufficient to reform them. Finally, it
can be argued that one who commits more than one crime should be
punished more severely than a first offender because all subsequent
crimes are aggravated, in a moral sense, by the fact of prior crimes.
For a general discussion of the history and purposes behind habitual offender laws, see Katkin, supra note 1, at 99-104. The efficacy of recidivist statutes in achieving their purposes has long been subject to doubt. See Katldn,
supra note 1, at 105-09. Katldn argues that habitual criminal statutes fail to
serve the purposes of protection of society and deterrence of serious offenders because truly dangerous felons may be sentenced to lengthy imprisonment without regard to recidivist statutes. Thus, habitual offender statutes
actually may only serve to deter and isolate individuals who commit minor
offenses not in themselves deserving of lengthy prison terms and from which
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of the fact that the invocation of an habitual criminal statute is
within the prosecutor's discretion in most states, 3 it could be asserted that habitual criminal laws also provide a bargaining tool
for the prosecutor and police in obtaining guilty pleas and information from an individual against whom an habitual criminal complaint could be fled.4 This selective application of habitual
5
criminal laws has been upheld on constitutional grounds.
Although the number of prior convictions required by the habitual criminal statute before sentence enhancement may be sought
varies from state to state, the majority of states adhere to a traditional scheme in which the number of prior convictions is the major triggering mechanism for application of the statute. 6

3.

4.

5.
6.

society does not urgently require protection. Citing studies like that of D.
WEST, THE HABrlUAL PRISONER (1963), Katkin asserts that the majority of
persistent offenders tend to be socially inadequate types, drug addicts and
alcoholics rarely involved in organized or violent crime. Katkin, supra note 1,
at 107-08.
For the arguments that (1) increased punishment in the same system that
failed to rehabilitate an offender the first time cannot be expected to achieve
the goal of rehabilitation, and (2) the goal of retribution is not achieved in
light of the disparate and discretionary use of habitual criminal laws within
states and between states, see Note, Don't Steal a Turkey in Arkansas-The
Second Felony Offender in New York, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 76, 85 n.82, 86-87
(1976). For further discussion of the failure of recividist laws to serve their
purposes, relating to the Nebraska law, see § III-B of text infra.
S. RUBIN, supra note 1, at 458; Note, RecidivistLaws under the Eighth Amendment-Rummel v. Estelle, 10 ToL. L. REV. 606, 607 (1979). Under Nebraska's
recidivist law, NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221 (Reissue 1975), the prosecutor has
complete discretion as to whether to file the habitual criminal information.
State v. Reed, 187 Neb. 792, 793, 194 N.W.2d 197, 180 (1972). For a discussion of
the prosecutor's discretion under the Nebraska habitual offender law, see
Note, The 'Bitch' Threatens,but Seldom Bites-A Study of Habitual Criminal
Sentencing in Douglas County, 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 893, 896 (1975). See also
§ mII-B-2 of text infra.
S. RUBIN, supra note 1, at 458; Klein, Habitual Offender Legislation and the
BargainingProcess,15 CRne. L. Q. 417, 426-35 (1973). Klein asserts that habitual offender legislation has failed to serve its purpose of protecting the public
from dangerous offenders, and that case studies indicate the threat of habitual offender proceedings has been used by law enforcement officials primarily against narcotics and burglary offenders in order to get information and
guilty pleas. Id. at 436.
See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-65 (1978).
Note, FoRDHAm L. REV., supra note 2, at 77; Note, ToL. L. REV., supra note 3, at
610. See ABA SENTENCING, supra note 1. A few states, e.g., Hawaii, New
Hampshire and Oregon, employ a Model Penal Code system under which the
decision as to whether to apply the statute is based on consideration of not
only the defendant's past criminal record, but also his propensity toward future crime and the nature of his latest offense. See id.; L. SLEFFEL, LAw AND
THE DANGEROUS CamNAL 2-3, 22-23 (1977).
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Nebraska's habitual criminal statute7 applies only if the prosecutor
has exercised the discretionary authority to file a supplementary
complaint seeking sentence enhancement. 8 Upon the filing of this
complaint, the court must apply the sentence enhancement provision if there is proof that the defendant has been convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned in any state or federal prison 9 for terms of
at least one year for each of two prior offenses. 10
From their inception, habitual criminal statutes have been attacked unsuccessfully upon the constitutional grounds" that they
constitute double jeopardy, 12 operate ex post facto, 13 violate due
process,' 4 inflict cruel and unusual punishment,15 and deny equal
protection.' 6 Nebraska's habitual criminal statute has also withstood these challenges as a legitimate exercise of legislative
power.' 7 The assertion that the habitual criminal statute violates
the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws has been
rejected on the grounds that "the penalty does not punish [the
criminal] for his previous offenses but for his persistence in
crime."' 8 Double jeopardy challenges have been rejected by the
courts upon the similar rationale that the recidivist statute does
7. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221 (Reissue 1975). The statute provides in relevant
part:
Whoever has been twice convicted of crime, sentenced and committed to prison, in this or any other state, or by the United States, or
once in this state and once at least in any other state, or by the
United States, for terms of not less than one year each, shall, upon
conviction of a felony committed in this state, be deemed to be an
habitual criminal, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex for a term of not less than
ten nor more than sixty years; Provided,that no greater punishment
is otherwise provided by statute, in which case the law creating the
greater punishment shall govern.
For a general discussion of the history of the Nebraska statute, see Note,
CREIGHTON L. REV., supra note 3, at 893-94.
8. See State v. Reed, 187 Neb. 792, 194 N.W.2d 179 (1972).
9. State v. Nance, 197 Neb. 257, 248 N.W.2d 339 (1976).
10. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221(1) (Reissue 1975).
11. For a general discussion of the constitutional attacks on habitual criminal
statutes, see Katkin, supra note 1, at 110-20; Comment, A CloserLook at Habitual Criminal Statutes: Brown v. Parrattand Martin v. Parrat,A Case
Study of the Nebraska Law, 16 Am. Cnpm. L. REV. 275 (1979).
12. Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
13. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948).
14. Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
15. Id.; McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901); Moore v. Missouri, 159
U.S. 673 (1895).
16. See, e.g., McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901); Moore v. Missouri,
159 U.S. 673 (1895).
17. For a recent, detailed analysis of the constitutionality of Nebraska's habitual
criminal statute, see Comment, supra note 11.
18. Taylor v. State, 114 Neb. 257, 263, 207 N.W. 207, 209 (1926).
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not set out a distinct crime and does not punish an offender a second time for his previous crimes, but instead "provides that the
repetition of criminal conduct aggrevates the crime and justifies
heavier penalties."' 9
Nebraska's habitual criminal statute was upheld in a recent
case 20 against a challenge that the prosecutor's discretion in applying the statute was a violation of due process because it gave the
prosecutor unbridled sentencing authority. Eighth amendment attacks based on the assertion that the statute's minimum
mandatory sentence of ten years would be excessive in some circumstances and that the statute's infrequent use rendered it invalid have also been dismissed.2 ' Recently, the Nebraska Supreme
Court rejected an equal protection attack based upon alleged racial discrimination in the application of the habitual criminal statute.22 Commenting upon the prosecutor's discretion to apply the
statute, the court noted that "the mere selectivity of enforcement
creates no constitutional defect" without a prima facie showing of
23
based on some im"intentional and purposeful discrimination"
24
race.
as
such
permissible criterion
A recent controversy concerning section 29-2221 did not involve
the statute's constitutionality, but rather the court's construction
of the statute's requirements that in order to be subjected to sentence enhancement, an offender must have been "twice convicted
of crime, sentenced and committed to prison ... for terms of not
less than one year each .... -25 In State v. Pierce,26 the court
faced, for the first time, the question of whether two prior felonies
committed on the same day, prosecuted under the same information, and for which the defendant was sentenced to concurrent
prison terms, could support the application of the habitual criminal enhancement provision after the defendant's conviction for a
third felony.27 The majority held that neither the absence of a time
19. State v. Losieau, 182 Neb. 367, 369, 154 N.W.2d 762, 763 (1967) (citation omitted).
20. Martin v. Parratt, 549 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1977).
21. Brown v. Parratt, 560 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1977).
22. State v. Bird Head, 204 Neb. 807, 285 N.W.2d 698 (1979).
23. Id. at 810, 285 N.W.2d at 701 (citation omitted).
24. Id.
25. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221 (Reissue 1975).
26. 204 Neb. 433, 283 N.W.2d 6 (1979).
27. Id. at 440,283 N.W.2d at 10. The Court noted that similar facts were present in
Huffman v. Sigler, 182 Neb. 290, 154 N.W.2d 459 (1967). Huffman was sentenced to one year for breaking and entering, one year for escape from custody to be served concurrently, and three years to be served consecutively for
robbery. He argued that consecutive sentences for his three prior felony convictions would not support his later sentence as an habitual criminal because
his continuous imprisonment amounted to only one four-year sentence. The

1980]

HABITUAL CRIMINAL ACT

interval between commitment to prison for the first offense and the
commission of the second offense, nor the fact that defendant was
sentenced to concurrent prison terms is relevant to the applicability of the habitual criminal statute. 2 8 A strong dissent argued that
the statute could not reasonably be construed to apply to an individual whose two prior burglaries were committed within minutes
of each other, resulting "in the filing of a single information and
conviction, sentencing,
and commitment out of the same court on
29
the same day."
Pierce presents a question of first impression, upon which the
statute is silent, i.e., the sequence of commission of crime, sentencing, and imprisonment required in order to count prior convictions
toward habitual criminal statutes. The holding is clearly against
the weight of authority in the majority of jurisdictions that have
considered this issue;3 0 it elicits a strong feeling of unfairness; and
court held that "[t]he defendant was thrice convicted of crime, sentenced
and committed to prison. It is of no consequence that the defendant was imprisoned continuously from the start of his 1-year sentences until the end of
the 3-year sentence." Id. at 291, 154 N.W.2d at 460.
The Pierce court essentially relied on Huffman to dispose of the defendant's contention that he was not an habitual criminal because he had not
been committed to prison for two distinct terms. 204 Neb. at 440, 283 N.W.2d
at 10. However, it must be noted that, despite the broad language in Huffman,
the court was generally presented with different issues and facts than those
presented in Pierce. Huffnan did not raise the issue of the sequence of prior
convictions, and the facts considered by the court in that case do not indicate
when the prior felonies took place or whether the convictions occurred under
the same information. See 182 Neb. at 290, 154 N.W.2d at 459. Thus, the
court's holding in Huffman should be limited to the proposition that
sentences need not be separated in time in order to qualify as commitments
to prison under section 29-2221. Another issue presented in Pierce which is
not relevant to this note concerned the defendant's claim that there was
newly discovered evidence mandating a new trial on the current felony conviction. The court upheld that trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial
on the grounds that there were "no additional facts. . . which are so potent
that if offered a new trial would probably result in a different verdict." 204
Neb. at 439, 283 N.W.2d at 10.
28. Id. at 443, 283 N.W.2d at 11-12.
29. Id. at 443-44, 283 N.W.2d at 12 (Hastings, J., dissenting, joined by Krivosha,
C.J. &McCown, J.).
30. State v. Carlson, 560 P.2d 26, 29 (Alaska 1977); Karz v. State, 279 So.2d 383, 384
(Dist. Ct. App. Fla., 1972); Cooper v. State, 259 Ind. 107, 113, 284 N.E.2d 799, 802
(1972); State v. Conley, 222 N.W.2d 501, 503 (Iowa 1974); State v. Lohrback, 217
Kan. 588, 596, 538 P.2d 678, 682 (1975); State v. Mitchell, 2 Wash. App. 943, 950,
472 P.2d 629, 633 (1970). See Moore v. Coiner, 303 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. W. Va.
1969); Gonzales v. State, 593 P.2d 257 (Alaska 1979); Washington v. United
States, 343 A.2d 560 (App. D.C. 1975); People v. Phillips, 56 IM.App. 3d 689, 371
N.E.2d 1214 (1978); State v. Tillman, 228 N.W.2d 38 (Iowa 1975); Coleman v.
Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 802, 125 S.W.2d 728 (1939); Jackson v. Henderson, 283
So. 2d 210 (La. 1973); State v. Sanchez, 87 N.M. 256, 531 P.2d 1229 (1975); Frazier v. State, 485 S.W.2d 877 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972); Ansell v. Common-

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:507

it suggests the inequity and inadequacy of an habitual criminal
statute which has a minimum mandatory sentencing scheme triggered at the prosecutor's discretion by only the number of prior
felony convictions. 31 These inadequancies and inequities, which
manifest themselves in the Pierce case, require legislative redress
or further judicial construction. This note will discuss the majority
and dissenting positions, and suggest the possible directions reform should take.
II.

FACTS

The state patrol made an agreement with an individual
whereby he was to set up drug buys in exchange for the patrol's
32
attempt to get certain felony drug charges against him dropped.
The patrol supplied this person with money and a radio transmitter for use in his transactions. On June 7, 1978, he made contact
with the defendant and arranged an amphetamine purchase. After
delivery later that evening, but while the defendant was still in the
company of the patrol's informant, the radio transmitter was discovered and a scuffle ensued. Law enforcement officers immedi33
ately entered the premises and arrested all parties.
The defendant was charged in count II of an amended information 3 4 with unlawfully delivering a controlled substance, amphetamines, under section 28-4,125. 35 In addition, a supplemental
information charging that the defendant was an habitual criminal
under section 29-2221 was ified, based upon allegations that on July
14, 1976, the defendant had been twice convicted, sentenced, and
36
committed to prison for terms of not less than one year each.
At trial the jury found the defendant guilty of delivery of a con-

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

wealth, 250 S.E.2d 760 (Va. 1979); State v. Brezillac, 19 Wash. App. 11, 573 P.2d
1343 (1978); Hill v. Boles, 149 W. Va. 779, 143 S.E.2d 467 (1965); Annot. 24
A.L.R.2d 1247 (1952).
For a discussion of these issues, see § rn-B of text infra.
204 Neb. at 435, 283 N.W.2d at 8.
Id. at 435-36, 283 N.W.2d at 8.
In count I the defendant was also charged with assault, but the jury did not
find him guilty on this charge. 204 Neb. at 437, 283 N.W.2d at 9.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-4,125 (Reissue 1975) (current version at NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-416 (Cum. Supp. 1978)).
204 Neb. at 434-35, 283 N.W.2d at 8. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221(2) (Reissue
1975) provides:
Where punishment of an accused as an habitual criminal is
sought, the facts with reference thereto must be charged in the indictment or information which contains the charge of the felony
upon which the accused is prosecuted, but the fact that the accused
is charged with being an habitual criminal shall not be an issue upon
the trial of the felony charge and shall not in any manner be disclosed to the jury. If the accused is convicted of a felony and before
sentence is imposed, a hearing shall be had before the court alone as
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trolled substance. At a subsequent hearing to consider the habitual criminal charge, 37 the trial court found that the defendant had
been previously convicted under a two-count information for burglary and grand larceny, and had been concurrently sentenced to
prison terms of eighteen months and one year respectively. The
incidents upon which these charges were based occurred on the
same day but at different locations.3 8 After denying his motion for
a new trial, the court found the defendant to be an habitual
crimi39
nal and sentenced him to a prison term of twelve years.
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Sequence of Crimes, Convictions, Sentencings and Imprisonments

On appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, the defendant chal-

40
lenged the trial court's finding that he was an habitual criminal.
He argued that since his prior two felony convictions were for offenses committed on the same day, and he was charged in only one
information and sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment,
he had not been "twice convicted of crime, sentenced and commit-41
ted to prison.., for terms of not less than one year each ....

37.
38.
39.

40.
41.

to whether such person has been previously convicted of prior felonies.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221 (Reissue 1975) requires that a separate hearing
must be had "before the court alone as to whether such person has been previously convicted of prior felonies."
204 Neb. at 437, 283 N.W.2d at 9.
Id. The maximum sentence the defendant could have received without the
habitual criminal sentence enhancement was five years. Id.; NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-4,125 (Reissue 1975) (current version at NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-416 (Cum.
Supp. 1978)).
For a delineation of defendant's other grounds for appeal, see note 27 supra.
204 Neb. at 440, 283 N.W.2d at 10 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221(1) (Reissue 1975)). Actually, defendant's challenge to the trial court's findings
presented at least two distinct arguments: (1) Concurrent sentences are not
sufficient to support enhancement because the defendant has only been committed to prison once, contrary to a strict reading of the statute. Brief for
Appellant at 15, State v. Pierce, 204 Neb. 433, 283 N.W.2d 6 (1979); and (2) the
statute should be interpreted to require that defendant must have committed
his second offenses after he had been convicted, sentenced, and committed to
prison for the first offense in order to satisfy the purpose of the statute. Id. at
16.
This note only deals with the sequential aspect of the defendant's argument primarily because the issue of concurrent sentences would normally
not arise if the defendant's position were adopted concerning the required
sequence. Defendant's argument concerning concurrent sentences may have
been answered in State v. Huffman. See note 27 supra. Also, it should be
noted that in Pierce the defendant might not be viewed as having been committed to prison only once for his two prior convictions, since his two concurrent sentences were for different lengths of time. Thus, after serving the oneyear sentence the defendant could be viewed as commencing service of the
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The defendant contended that in keeping with the purpose of the
habitual criminal statute as expressed in State v. Losieau42-punishment of the repetition of criminal conduct-the statute should
be construed to require that the second or third offense be committed subsequent to the commission and conviction on the first or
second offense. The court in Pierce agreed "that such reasoning
would be applicable to the principle offense, i.e., the offense for
which enhancement is sought must have been committed after
conviction and sentencing for the two prior offenses." 43 However,
the court did not believe "that a reading of our statute on its face
requires or supports
such a holding with regard to the prior of44
fenses themselves."
The court then quoted language from Ansell v. Commonwealth45 as expressive of its philosophy: "We have stated that the
purposes of the recividist statute are to protect society against ha'46
bitual criminals and to impose further punishment upon them.
Although the court's opinion is not clear on this point, the purpose
of this quote is apparently to refute the rationale employed by
some jurisdictions that "a defendant should receive two separate
and independent warnings before being charged as an habitual
criminal or that the defendant should have two separate opportunities for the beneficent influence of penal incarceration before giving up on him as an habitual criminal." 47
The Nebraska Supreme Court's reasoning in Pierce cannot
withstand even moderate scrutiny, and reaches what appears to be
an unduly harsh result. In fact, the court's holding may stem from
a narrow, unreasoned interpretation of the purpose and legislative

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

remaining eighteen month sentence with credit for time already served.
Brief for Appellee at 12.
Also, it should be noted that the one jurisdiction with an habitual criminal
act similar to section 29-2221 which has considered the issue of concurrent
sentences in this context, concluded that the fact that sentences were served
concurrently was irrelevant, even though the recidivist statute was interpreted as requiring that "the offense, conviction, and imposition of penalty
must precede each succeeding offense, conviction, and imposition of penalty
for the statute to be applicable." State v. Robinson, 262 N.W.2d 270, 272 (Iowa
1978) (quoting State v. Conley, 222 N.W.2d 501 at 503 (Iowa 1974)). In Robinson the defendant, while on parole for his first offense, was convicted of a
second offense for which he was sentenced to an additional term to be served
concurrently with the remainder of his sentence for his first offense.
182 Neb. 367, 369, 154 N.W.2d 762, 763-64 (1967).
204 Neb. at 441-42, 283 N.W.2d at 11.
Id. at 442, 283 N.W.2d at 11.
250 S.E.2d 760 (Va. 1979).
204 Neb. at 442,283 N.W.2d at 11 (quoting Ansell v. Commonwealth, 250 S.E.2d
at 761).
204 Neb. at 442, 283 N.W.2d at 11.
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intent of the statute, as well as the statute itself in light of the
court's prior holdings and rules of statutory construction.
1.

Statutory Construction

In State v. Nance,4 8 the Nebraska Supreme Court indicated that
a penal statute generally is required to be strictly construed; "if
possible a court will try to avoid a construction that leads to absurd, unjust, or unconscionable results. A sensible construction
will be placed upon a statute to effectuate the object of the legislation rather than a literal meaning .... "49 The Pierce case arguably presents a prime example of the interpretation of a statute
leading to an unjust result. The defendant was classified as an habitual criminal and sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment as a result of the two prior crimes (occurring on the same
day) and his recent drug offense. He was given only one chance to
respond to incarceration between periods of criminal activity, but
is being treated more harshly than another individual who engaged in two equally or more serious crimes separated by that individual's term of imprisonment. Under the court's own rules of
construction, an interpretation of a penal statute should not lead to
such unjust or disparate treatment of individuals unless it is
clearly required to achieve the objective of the statute.
Admittedly, a court's interpretation of a statute must be sensible in light of the legislative purpose of the statute, and Nebraska's
habitual offender laws may not have the same purpose as the laws
48. 197 Neb. 257, 248 N.W.2d 339 (1976). The Nance court held that a reasonable
interpretation of the statute required a conclusion that two prior convictions
in two separate states were sufficient to support criminal enhancements. Id.
at 260, 248 N.W.2d at 341.
49. Id. at 260, 248 N.W.2d at 341. The principle of strict construction of penal statutes in favor of the defendant has been explicitly considered by other jurisdictions in this context. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 56 Ill. App. 689, 695, 371
N.E.2d 1214, 1218-19 (1978); State v. Conley, 222 N.W.2d 501, 503 (Iowa 1974);
Ansell v. Commonwealth, 250 S.E.2d 760, 761 (Va. 1979). See generally Note,
Court Treatment of General Recidivist Statutes, 48 COLUM. L REV. 238, 244
(1948).
Under these principles two jurisdictions with habitual criminal statutes
containing the same triggering wording, i.e., 'twice convicted, sentenced and
committed to prison," have come to a conclusion opposite that of the Nebraska majority. They interpreted their statutes to require that the defendant be twice convicted, twice sentenced, and twice imprisoned with each
conviction subsequent to the prior sentencing and imprisonment. Cooper v.
State, 259 Ind. 107,284 N.E.2d 799 (1972); State v. Conley, 222 N.W.2d 501 (Iowa
1974). The dissenting opinion in Pierce cites these cases with approval. 204
Neb. 433, 444, 283 N.W.2d 6, 12 (Hastings, J., dissenting, joined by Krivosha,
C.J. & McCown, J.). For further discussion of Conley and Cooper, see notes
81-86 & accompanying text infra.
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of other states. 50 However, it could be argued that the court in
Pierce failed to adequately analyze the purpose of the Nebraska
recividist law. Instead, the court may have simply applied one poswithout considering its own
sible literal reading of the statute
51
rules of statutory construction.
2. Purpose of the Habitual Criminal Statute
The court in Pierce essentially relied on three sources for its
conclusions concerning the purpose of the habitual criminal statute: (1) State v. Losieau,52 (2) Ansell v. Commonwealth,5 3 and tacitly, (3) the language of the statute. 54 Losieau, however, may have
been interpreted too narrowly and may be inapposite to the conclusion the court derived from that opinion. Essentially, the court
cites Losieau for the proposition that "the very purpose of the
hbitual [sic] criminal act is to penalize the repetition of criminal
.- 55 Although the Losieau court did make this stateconduct ...
ment, it was made in the context of a case involving an individual
who had been convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned on three separate and independent occasions for crimes committed over an extended period of time. The issue was whether a defendant who
had been previously sentenced as an habitual criminal was eligible
for habitual criminal sentence enhancement for a fourth felony
conviction several years later.56
If, as Losieau might be read to imply, the only purpose of the
50. See, e.g., cases cited note 49 supra.
51. The court's reading of the language of section 29-2221, "twice convicted of
crime, sentenced and committed to prison... for terms of not less than one
year each," appears to isolate each element of the phrase independently of
the other, i.e., (1) twice convicted, (2) sentenced, (3) committed to prison.
An equally plausible literal reading of the same language as a whole could be:
(1) convicted, sentenced, committed to prison, (2) convicted, sentenced, committed to prison. See generally cases cited in note 49 supra.
The Piercecourt's literal and expansive reading of section 29-2221 could be
contrasted with the court's very recent interpretation of the same statute in
State v. Chapman, 205 Neb. 368, 287 N.W.2d 697 (1980). In Chapman the court
said that it was "reluctant to apply an expansive reading to the Habitual
Criminal Act, and held that "offenses which are felonies because the defendant has previously been convicted of the same crime do not constitute 'felonies' within the meaning of prior felonies that enhance penalties under the
habitual criminal statute." Id. at 370, 287 N.W.2d at 697.
52. 182 Neb. 367, 154 N.W.2d 762.
53. 250 S.E.2d 760 (Va. 1979).
54. For the relevant text of section 29-2221, see notes 7, 36 supra.
55. 204 Neb. at 441, 283 N.W.2d at 11 (quoting Losieau, 182 Neb. at 369, 154 N.W.2d
at 764).
56. The court held that service of one habitual criminal sentence does not wipe
the slate clean and that the prior convictions may be used again for further
enhancement upon a subsequent conviction. 182 Neb. 367, 370, 154 N.W.2d
762, 764.
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habitual criminal law is to punish the repetition of crime, then the
court's interpretation of the statute might be viable. However,
Losieau does not necessarily support that proposition. There is
also language in the opinion indicating that the statute "does not
punish a defendant for his previous offenses, but for his persistence in crime. '5 7 It is submitted, and was accepted by the dissent
in Pierce, that "persistence in crime" connotes something more
than just the gross numerical repetition of criminal conduct.5 8 It
implies an unwillingness to be deterred from criminal activity after
a reason for deterrence is given.59 On this point the Washington
court in State v. Brezillac6o stated that "[i]t does seem reasonable
that there must be a time interval between convictions to show the
defendant's persistence in criminal conduct."6 1 It is difficult to see
how an individual who commits two crimes within minutes of each
other on the same day can be viewed as persisting in crime to the
same extent as an individual who commits two crimes separated
by conviction and imprisonment, yet this is the conclusion that the
Pierce decision requires.
Relying on language from Ansell v. Commonwealth62 to express
its philosophy in the Pierce case, the Nebraska Court rejected the
argument that a defendant should receive two independent warnings or opportunities for the influence of imprisonment before being considered an habitual criminal. The court's philosophy is that
the protection of society from, and the increased punishment of,
habitual criminals are the purposes of recidivists statutes. 63 However, analysis of the Ansell case suggests one of the flaws in the
Nebraska court's reasoning-the failure of the court to distinguish
between the mechanics and purposes of general recidivist laws
and those of statutes strictly punishing the repetition of certain violent criminal conduct.
Ansell involved the interpretation of a Virginia statute enhancing the penalties for multiple use or attempted use of firearms in
the commission of certain dangerous crimes. 64 The court in Ansell
57. Id. at 369, 154 N.W.2d at 763.
58. See 204 Neb. at 444, 283 N.W.2d at 12 (Hastings, J., dissenting, joined by
Krivosha, C.J. & McCown, J.).
59. Cf.State v. Mitchell, 2 Wash. App. 943, 472 P.2d 629 (1970) (it "is not so much
that the defendant has sinned more than once as that he is deemed incorrigible when he persists in violations of the law after conviction of previous infractions." Id. at 950, 472 P.2d at 633 (quoting 24 A.L.R.2d 1247 at 1248)).
60. 19 Wash. App. 11, 573 P.2d 1343 (1978).
61. Id. at 16, 573 P.2d at 1346 (citation omitted).
62. 250 S.E.2d 760 (Va. 1979).
63. 204 Neb. at 442, 283 N.W.2d at 11.
64. VA. CODE § 18.2-53.1 (Supp. 1979), provides that the use, attempted use, or
threatening display of a firearm while attempting or committing murder,
rape, robbery, burglary or abduction is a separate felony and that any person
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noted that this statute providing additional punishment for the
commission of the same offense, sometimes characterized as a specific recividist statute, was criminal in nature. 65 In contrast, a general recividist statute is a statutory sentencing procedure which
punishment has failed
imposes punishment because the previous
66
to achieve the reform that was intended.
The Virginia Supreme Court specifically distinguished the purposes of this type of specific recividist statute from those of general recidivist statutes like Nebraska's section 29-2221. The general
recidivist statute, in addition to public protection and punishment,
has the related purpose of serving as a warning and incentive to
reform. 67 Noting that, unlike a general recividist statute, the type
of specific recividist statute concerning firearm use creates a
crime, is non-discretionary in its application, is restricted to serious felonies, and employs inflexible penalties to run consecutively,
the Ansell court concluded that the primary purpose of the firearms statute was to protect society by deterring the repetition of
certain violent criminal conduct. 68 Therefore, the court reasoned
that conviction on a prior offense need not precede the commission
69
of that same offense again in order to trigger increased penalties.
If the purposes behind section 29-2221 are the protection of society from and the punishment of habitual criminals, it is doubtful
that such purposes mandate the interpretation of the statute given
by the Nebraska court in Pierce. In rejecting the assertion that an
individual should be given two independent warnings or two
chances for reform before being considered an habitual criminal
the court is reading section 29-2221 as if it were the type of specific
recidivist statute found in Ansell.70 This reading of the statute is
simply not consistent with either the language of the statute 7 l or
with the court's consistent approval of the discretionary and infrequent invocation of the statute by the prosecutor. 72 Arguably, if
the legislature had intended such a strict application of the statute
providing that an offender should not have two separate warnings
and opportunities for reform, it would have made the statute
mandatory in its application and chosen a statutory scheme similar to the type of specific recidivist penalty construed in Ansell:

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

convicted of that offense a second or subsequent time must receive an additional three-year consecutive term of imprisonment for each conviction.
See 250 S.E.2d at 761.
Id.
Id. at 762.
Id.
See id. at 763.
See notes 64-69 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 7, 36 & accompanying text supra.
See note 3 supra; § III-B-2 of text infra.
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mandatory specific penalties for each repetition of specifically enu73
merated dangerous crimes.
Furthermore, if the purposes of the statute are protection of society from and punishment of habitual offenders, it must first be
determined that an individual is an habitual offender. The court in
Pierce seemingly fails to consider or make any distinction between
the purposes underlying the two prior convictions and terms of imprisonment, and those underlying the habitual offender sentence.
Perhaps reformation of the criminal is not the purpose of the habitual criminal statute, 74 but it certainly could be considered one of
the purposes of the penalties provided for the two prior felony convictions. 7 5 As the dissent argues, "[r] ecidivist statutes... are intended to apply to persistent violators who have not responded to
the restraining influence of conviction and punishment." 76 Thus, it
is the failure of the defendant to respond to two warnings and ordinary doses of punishment or rehabilitation that defines his persistence and makes him an habitual
criminal from whom society
77
requires additional protection.
The finding of the Nebraska court-that the statute on its face
supports a conclusion that the offense for which enhancement is
sought must have been committed after the two prior convictions
and sentencings, but that there need be no time interval between
the conviction and imprisonment for the first offense and the commission of the second offense-essentially transforms a three offense habitual criminal statute into a two offense statute when the
two prior offenses occur on the same day and are charged in one
information. However, section 29-2221 does not provide the potentially less severe sentence enhancement 78 for a second felony conviction that is common in states with second offender sentence
enhancement statutes. 7 9 The Pierce finding is inconsistent with
73. See notes 64-69 & accompanying text supra.
74. But see Note, N.Y.U. L. REv., supra note 2.
75. See generally S. RuBiN, supra note 1, at 784-86. Cf. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 802, 803, 125 S.W.2d 728, 728 (1939) ('The animating purposes
of inflicting penalties for violations of criminal law is ... reformation of the
culprit, if it seems possible, and protection of society."). For examples of Nebraska cases acknowledging that rehabilitation is one of function of criminal
penalties, see State v. Suggett, 200 Neb. 693, 264 N.W.2d 876 (1978); State v.
Moore, 198 Neb. 317, 252 N.W.2d 617 (1977).
76. 204 Neb. at 442, 283 N.W.2d at 12 (citation omitted).
77. Cf.State v. Jones, 138 Wash. 110, 111, 244 P. 395, 395 (1926) ("when that hope
of reformation had passed, the increased punishment [under the habitual
criminal statute] should be meted out, but only then.").
78. Section 29-2221 provides a minimum sentence of 10 years and a maximum of

60 unless the penalty for the current offense is greater. NEB. REV.STAT. § 292221 (Reissue 1975).

79. E.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.050 (1972) (repealed effective 1980) provided that a
person previously convicted of a felony, upon commission and conviction of a
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the court's assertion that one is an habitual criminal if one repeats
a certain number of criminal acts in that it implies that something
more than just the repetition of criminal conduct is involved in the
determination of habitual criminality. It suggests that warnings or
opportunities for reform are inherent in the statute. However, if
the legislature intended to allow only one warning and one opportunity to reform, it could have very easily done so by adopting a
statute that provided enhanced punishment for the commission of
a second offense after conviction and imprisonment for the first offense. 80
The dissenting opinion in Pierce relied on a more appealing interpretation of recidivist statutes similar to section 29-2221 by Iowa
and Indiana courts. 81 In State v. Conley,82 the Iowa court based its
analysis on the fundamental premise accepted by the Nebraska
court: 83 penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the
accused and reasonably interpreted in light of the purpose of the
statute.84 The Iowa court concluded that before an individual may
be sentenced as an habitual criminal, there must be two prior convictions, two sentencings, and two imprisonments and the commission of each offense must be subsequent to the imprisonment upon
conviction for the prior offense. 85 The court reasoned that
"fr] ecidivist statutes are enacted in an effort to deter and punish
incorrigible offenders.... They are intended to apply to persistent violators who have not responded to the restraining influence
of conviction and punishment. '86 The court noted that by its terms
the statute "makes the nature of disposition of the two prior con-

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

86.

subsequent felony is punishable by imprisonment for not less than the minimum or more than twice the maximum prescribed for that felony. See also
note 99 infra.
See, e.g., note 79 supra; note 99 infra.
See 204 Neb. at 444, 283 N.W.2d at 12 (Hastings, J., dissenting, joined by
Krivosha, C.J. & McCown, J.).
222 N.W.2d 501 (Iowa 1974). Accord, State v. Tillman, 228 N.W.2d 38 (Iowa
1975); Cooper v. State, 259 Ind. 107, 284 N.E.2d 799 (1972).
See note 48 & accompanying text supra.
222 N.W.2d at 502.
Id. at 503. The Iowa statute construed in Conley, IOWA CODE § 747.5 (1975)
(repealed 1976) (current version at IowA CODE § 902.8 (1979)), provided in
relevant part that "[w] hoever has been twice convicted of crime, sentenced,
and committed to prison ... for terms of not less than three years each shall,
be deemed to be a habitual criminal ......
upon conviction of a felony.
Id. at 501-02.
The Indiana statute in Cooperprovided in relevant part that "[elvery person who, after having been twice convicted, sentenced and imprisoned...
for felony,. . . shall be convicted ... in this state for a felony. . . , shall be
deemed and taken to be an habitual criminal. . . ." IND. CODE ANN.§ 9-2207
(Burns 1971) (repealed 1976) (current version at InD. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8
(Burns 1979)).
222 N.W.2d at 503 (citations omitted).
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victions determinative of their use" 87 for habitual criminal sentence enhancement upon a third conviction. "The defendant must
have been on each prior occasion 'convicted of crime, sentenced
and committed to prison .... .' Significantly, the statute emphasizes conviction and disposition of the prior offense. There can be
no recidivism until after conviction of crime and imposition of penalty. '8 8 Perhaps the Iowa and Indiana courts reached their conclusions because they considered the principles of statutory
interpretation and gave meaning to each word of the statute, including the phrase "twice ... imprisoned." In effect, the Nebraska
court's interpretation has eliminated that precondition.
In addition to the rationale presented above, courts in jurisdictions with habitual offender laws similar to those relied on by the
majority opinion 89 have relied on sound policy arguments to support the proposition that each successive felony must be committed after the previous felony conviction and imprisonment in order
90
to be considered for habitual criminal status. In State v. Carlson,
the court noted that a convicted criminal who has not responded to
the opportunity to reform presented by penal sanctions and subsequently commits another offense may be considered a worse offender than an individual who does not have any prior convictions;
thus, harsher sanctions may be justified. However, in the situation
in which two convictions occur on the same day, the individual is
given only one opportunity to reform. Thus, if convictions occurring on the same day were to be considered separately for the purposes of habitual criminal sentence enhancement, "an individual
who committed four crimes within a short time, and was given at
most one opportunity to reform, would be treated the same as a
defendant who had three opportunities to reform over a substan9
tial period of time, but has persisted in his criminal conduct."'
This is essentially the result under the Pierce decision; it is hard to
believe that the legislature could have intended such unjust disparity of treatment.
3. Authorities Relied on by the Court
Despite a lack of substantial Nebraska precedent or past analysis concerning either the purpose of the Nebraska recividist statute or the issue presented by the Pierce case, it is somewhat
surprising that the court sought guidance from jurisdictions with
87. Id. at 502.
88. Id. at 502-03 (citation omitted).
89. For discussion of the statutes in the jurisdictions relied on by the Pierce majority, see § I1-A-3 of text infra.
90. 560 P.2d 26, 30 (Alaska 1977).
91. Id.
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substantially distinguishable statutory schemes rather than looking to those jurisdictions with statutes similar to Nebraska's section 29-2221.92 The court recognized that "very possibly the
'93
majority view is contrary to the one adopted by us here today,
and adopted the logic of Cox v. State and State v. Williams:
[Tihe argument is made that under multiple offender legislation, which is
directed at recidivism, 'Theincreased penalties for habitual offenders are
not intended to follow according to a numerical count of the offender's
crimes, but are imposed for his successive failures to rehabilitate himself.
The result is that two or more offenses of a contemporaneous nature
amount to but one offense.' This argument might be effective if addressed
to the lawmakers. But with respect to the judicial interpretation
of the
94
particular statute under consideration it has no merit.

The "logic" of the court's argument, of course depends upon the
"particular statute under consideration," 95 and the statutes construed in Williams and Cox are significantly distinguishable from
Nebraska's section 29-2221.
Several points should be made about the habitual offender
law 96 that was interpreted by the Louisiana court in Williams.
First, as cited in Williams, the statute provided in relevant part
that "[i]f the judge finds that [the defendant] has been convicted
of a prior felony or felonies,. . . the court shall sentence him to the
punishment prescribed in this statute . . . . 97 The statute does
not refer to imprisonment. In contrast, Nebraska section 29-2221
provides that one who "has been twice convicted of crime, sentenced and committed to prison,. . . for terms of not less than one
year each" 98 shall be subjected to the enhancement provisions of
the statute upon conviction of a third felony.
In addition, Louisiana's recidivist statute contained a sentencing scheme providing different minimum and maximum determinate penalties for a second, third, fourth and subsequent felony.99
92. See, e.g., note 85 supra.
93. 204 Neb. at 442, 283 N.W.2d at 11. See note 30 supra.
94. 204 Neb. at 442-43, 283 N.W.2d at 11 (quoting Cox v. State, 255 Ark. 204, 211, 499
S.W.2d 630, 634 (1973) (quoting State v. Williams, 226 La. 862, 866, 77 So. 2d 515,
516 (1955)). Like Pierce, Cox and Williams dealt with the issue of whether
multiple prior convictions on the same day in court for crimes apparently
committed on the same day could be separately counted as prior convictions
for later enhancement under the habitual criminal statutes. 255 Ark. at 20809, 499 S.W.2d at 633; 226 La. at 864, 77 So. 2d at 516.
95. Id. at 443, 283 N.W.2d at 11 (quoting Cox v. State, 255 Ark. 204, 211, 499 S.W.2d
630, 634 (1973) (quoting State v. Williams, 226 La. 862, 866, 77 So.2d 515, 516
(1955)).
96. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1 (West 1967) (amended 1978).
97. 226 La. at 866, 77 So. 2d at 516 (quoting LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1).
98. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221 (Reissue 1975).
99. For example, the statute provided in part that:
A. Any person who, after having been convicted under the laws
of any other state or of the United States, or any foreign government
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The punishments provided under the statute were based on what
the determinate sentence for that felony would be if it were a first
conviction. For example, an individual convicted of a third felony
in the Pierce situation would have been subject to only a two and
one-half to ten year sentence under a Louisiana-type habitual
criminal statute, 10 0 rather than "not less than ten nor more than
sixty years" under Nebraska law.' 0 ' In light of the fact that Louisiana's statute provided potentially less severe enhanced penalties
for repeat offenders, it is understandable that the Williams court
could have construed its statute as being based only on the
number of repetitions of criminal conduct. However, it must be
noted that immediately after Williams, the Louisiana legislature
revised the statute l0 2 to provide that an offender can be considered
"a second offender only if the crime resulting in the second conviction shall have been committed after his first conviction; ... a
third offender.., only if the crime resulting in the third conviction
shall have been committed after his conviction for a crime which in
fact caused him to be a second offender."'10 3 This revision was seen
as a repudiation of the Williams court's interpretation 0 4
Similar factors and arguments distinguish the Arkansas habitual offender law' 05 which was construed by the Cox court. The
or country of a crime which, if committed in this state would be a

100.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

felony, thereafter commits any subsequent felony within this state
upon conviction of said felony shall be punished as follows:
(1) If the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the
offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less
than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be
for a determinate term not less than one-third the longest term
and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first
conviction;
(2) If the third felony is such that, upon a first conviction, the
offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less
than his natural life, then the person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for any term not less than one-half the longest term prescribed for a first conviction; ....
LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1 (West 1967) (amended 1978).
Id. The maximum penalty Pierce could have received for his conviction of
delivery of amphetamines without the habitual criminal sentence enhancement was five years. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-4,125 (Reissue 1975) (current version at NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-416 (Cum. Supp. 1978)).
NEB.REV. STAT. § 29-2221 (Reissue 1975).
Jackson v. Henderson, 283 So. 2d 210, 212 (La. 1973).
LA. REV. STAT. § 15:529.1(B) (West 1967) (amended 1978).
283 So. 2d at 212.
Amc. STAT. ANN.§ 43-2328 (Supp. 1975) (current version at APYc STAT. ANi.
§ 41-1001 (1977)) provided in relevant part:
Any person convicted of an offense, which is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, who shall subsequently be convicted of another such offense, shall be punished as follows:
(2)

If the third offense is such that, upon a first conviction, the
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Arkansas statute began sentence enhancement for repeat offenders after the conviction for the second offense and provided a sentencing scheme which appears to be far less harsh than
Nebraska's. 106 For example, under an Arkansas-type habitual
criminal scheme a defendant similar to Pierce would only be subject to a maximum sentence of five years 10 7 for his third offense,
unless the minimum sentence for that offense plus three years was
more than the maximum. 0 8
Other factors may have strongly influenced the Arkansas
court's willingness in Cox to construe the Arkansas recidivist law
as being based only on the number of prior crimes. Prior to the
Arkansas court's decision in Cox, the Arkansas legislature had
amended section 43-2328, eliminating a provision which explicitly
provided that a subsequent offense must be committed after the
conviction and discharge from prison for a prior offense in order to
be considered for the purposes of sentence enhancement. 109 In
light of this fact, the Arkansas court in Cox, unlike the Nebraska
Supreme Court in Pierce, was not without explicit expression of
the legislative intent concerning the sequence of prior convictions."10
The Pierce majority also refers in passing to State v. Bomar,"'
where a Tennessee court held that two offenses committed at separate times, for which the defendant was convicted on the same day,
offender could be punished by imprisonment for a term less than his
natural life, then the person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a
determinate term not less than three (3) years more than the minimum sentence provided by law for a first conviction of the offense for
which the defendant is being tried, and not more than the maximum
sentence provided by law for the offense, unless the maximum sentence is less than the minimum sentence plus three (3) years, in
which case the longer term shall govern.
106. Id.
107. Five years was the maximum sentence for delivery of a controlled substance
in the Pierce situation. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-4,125 (Reissue 1975) (current
version NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-416 (Cum. Supp. 1978)).
108. Id. There is no minimum sentence for delivery of amphetamines in Nebraska. The statute allows penalties of a fine of not more than two thousand
dollars or imprisonment for not more than six months in the county jail.
109. 1967 ARK. ACTS No. 639, § 1, p. 1174 (amending ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2328 (1964)
(current version at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2328 (Supp. 1975)). The statute prior
to amendment read in relevant part: "[A] ny person convicted of any offense
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, who has been discharged,
either upon compliance with the sentence or upon pardon or parole, and shall
subsequently be convicted of any offense committed after such discharge,
pardon or parole shall be punished as follows."
110. This line of argument was followed in State v. Carlson, 560 P.2d 26, 29 (Alaska
1977) (distinguishing the construction that the Oregon courts had placed on
their similar habitual offender statute).
111. 213 Tenn. 487, 376 S.W.2d 446 (1964).
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constituted two convictions under the Tennessee recidivist statute. 112 The Tennessee statutory scheme is also significantly different from Nebraska's in that it provides that "[a] ny person who has
either been three (3) times convicted ... of felonies, not less than
two (2) of which are among those specified... shall be considered
3
... to be an habitual criminal.""
This statute makes no mention
of a requirement for sentencing and imprisonment as does Nebraska section 29-2221, and is limited in application to specific dangerous crimes. Moreover, the Tennessee recidivist statute
explicitly provides that "each of such three (3) convictions shall be
for separate offenses,
committed at different times, and on sepa114
rate occasions."
The meaning of the phrase "committed at different times, and
on separate occasions" apparently has not been fully delineated by
the Tennessee courts. However, in Fazier v. State," 5 the court,
construing this phrase, held that five convictions for burglaries all
committed on the same date should be considered as only one conviction for the purposes of habitual criminal prosecution." 6 Thus,
even under Tennessee's somewhat stricter scheme, a defendant
like Pierce would not be considered an habitual criminal. Arguably, because his prior offenses occurred on the same day, his incorrigibility would not have been demonstrated.
Analysis of the recidivist statute construed in the decisions
cited by the majority in Pierce reveals significant differences in
statutory schemes 117 and legislative histories"18 from those in Nebraska; differences that might explain the Arkansas and Louisiana
courts' rejection of the argument that increased penalties for habitual offenders should not be based only on the number of defendant's past crimes. In light of these dissimilarities between the
habitual criminal statutes in these jurisdictions and section 292221, it is submitted that the majority's reliance on them for support in Pierce was misplaced.
B.

Directions for Reform

Upholding the position taken by the dissent in Pierce," 9 and
following the example provided by the Louisiana legislature after
112. TENN.CODE ANN.§ 40-2801 (1975).

113. Id. Crimes specified include: assault with intent to murder or rape, mayhem,
malicious shooting, abduction of a female, rape, robbery, and burglary.
114. Id.
115. 485 S.W.2d 877 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).
116. Id. at 881.
117. See notes 97-101, 105-08, 113-16 & accompanying text supra.
118. See notes 102-03, 104-10 & accompanying text supra.
119. 204 Neb. at 444, 283 N.W.2d at 12 (Hastings, J., dissenting, joined by Krivosha,

C.J. &McCown, J.).
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the Williams decision, 120 the Nebraska Legislature should, at a
minimum, repudiate the Pierce decision by amending section 292221 to provide that each felony must be committed after conviction, sentencing, and imprisonment for the prior felony in order to
be counted toward habitual criminal status. This change would at
least eliminate one of the inequities present in the Pierce situation: the harsher treatment of offenders given only one chance to
respond to sanctions than of offenders who have been given two
opportunities to respond. It would also provide a more adequate
indication of whether an individual should be considered a persistent offender deserving increased punishment and from whom society needs more protection. 12 1 However, additional revision is
120. See note 102 & accompanying text supra.
121. An amendment to section 29-2221 has been introduced in the Nebraska Unicameral in response to Pierce. The amendment provides:
The conviction for two or more felonies committed as part of a single
course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in
the nature of the criminal conduct constitutes one conviction ... but
offenses... committed while attempting to escape detention or apprehension are not part of the same course of criminal conduct.
L.B. 799, 86th Leg., 2d Sess. (1980).
Unfortunately L.B. 799 may not rectify the Pierce decision, and may inadequately address the other major inadequacies and inequities of the habitual
criminal statute. See §§ Il-B-1, to -3 of text infra, for discussion of these inadequacies and inequities. The phrases in L.B. 799, "single course of criminal
conduct" and "no substantial change in the nature of criminal conduct" are
sufficiently ambiguous to require further legislative definition before their
meaning becomes clear.
However, a "single course of criminal conduct" might be construed to apply only to a situation in which an individual commits two felonies almost
simultaneously, e.g., breaking and entering followed by a larceny at the same
location. If so interpreted, L.B. 799 would not eliminate the current disparity
of treatment that results from treating an individual who has had only one
opportunity to respond to criminal sanctions more harshly than an individual
who has had two chances to respond. Also, this amendment really would not
provide any greater indication of the persistence of an individual's criminal
conduct than does the current habitual criminal statue as interpreted by the
court in Pierce. Furthermore, if so interpreted, this amendment would not
even apply to the defendant in Pierce, since his two prior crimes (burglary
and grand larceny) upon which his habitual criminal sentence was based,
occurred "on the same day, but at different locations." 204 Neb. at 437, 283
N.W.2d at 9.
More importantly, however, it must be noted that L.B. 799 was taken directly from the Persistent Offenders sentencing provisions of the UNIFORM
LAw COMMISSIONERS' MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONs ACT, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAw ENFORCEMENT

ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE § 3-105 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MSCA]. The definition of prior conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement adopted in L.B. 799 is only part of a carefully devised and
interrelated sentencing scheme in the Model Act that is almost totally distinguishable from Nebraska's scheme. See MSCA §§ 3-101 to -116. For a general
discussion of the Model Act, see Perlman & Potuto, The Uniform Law Corn-
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needed to ameliorate the inadequacy and unfairness of the habitual criminal statute caused by its reliance on solely the quantity of
convictions as a measure for habitual criminality, the discretionary
and infrequent application of the statute by prosecutors, 22 the
minimum mandatory ten-year sentence and the maximum sixtyyear sentence. These provisions may render the statute incapable
of serving any of its asserted purposes and frequently lead to other
inequities.
1.

Quantity of Convictions

Using quantity of convictions as the only criterion for the application of the habitual criminal statute provides an unreliable guide
for distinguishing the habitual from the non-habitual criminal in
the sociological sense 12 3 and represents one of the major flaws in
the scheme. 124 It fails to take into account either the specific na5
ture of the crimes committed or the character of the offender.12
Such a scheme fails to account for the length of time between prior
convictions and the current offense for which enhancement is being sought. Thus, it could be argued, if several years have passed
between punishment for one offense and the commission of another, an individual should not be considered an habitual offender. 12 6 A question also arises as to whether crimes committed
by an individual in his teens or early twenties are sufficient indications of that individual's unreformable character or persistence in
missioners Model Sentencing and CorrectionsAct An OverView, 58

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

NEB.

L.

REV. 925 (1979).
Although the Model Act is far too complex for treatment in this note, a few
of the major distinguishing characteristics relating to persistent offenders
should be noted. Persistent offenders are defined as persons who have "at
least two prior felony convictions for offenses committed within the 5 years
immediately preceding commission of the instant offense ...
[but] [in establishing the 5-year period, time spent in confinement may not be included
.... " MSCA at § 3-105. The maximum sentence to which a persistent offender may be sentenced is twice the maximum for the particular class of
felony he has most recently committed. Id. § 3-104. Although the prosecutor
still appears to have the discretion as to whether to seek persistent offender
sentence enhancement, see id. §§ 3-202 to -207, the act does not mandate sentence enhancement for all persistent offenders; "it merely provides a greater
range of sanctions to be used by the ... sentencing courts." Id. at 116. It is
submitted that LB. 799's use of a small portion of the Persistent Offender
provisions of the Model Act outside the framework of that act is inappropriate.
See § III-B-2 of text infra.
S. Rumn, supra note 1, at 465; Note, FORDHAM L REV., supra note 2, at 89.
Katkin, supra note 1, at 101-02.
Id.
See S. RuBi, supra note 1, at 465; Note, CREIGHTON L. REV., supra note 3, at
896.
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crime to justify lengthy prison terms. 127
A statute triggered by the quantity of prior convictions fails to
distinguish between violent and non-violent crimes and is contrary
to the basic assumption that in the interest of public safety individuals committing violent crimes should be more readily and severely subjected to habitual criminal sentence enhancement than
should those committing non-violent crimes. 128 It also has been
noted that the quantity of convictions criterion results in problems
in defining a valid prior conviction from another state due to the
variance in classification of crimes and sentencing from state to
state. 129 This can result in the non-consideration of a prior conviction which resulted in less than a one-year sentence, even though
the defendant may in fact be known to be dangerous. It may also
result in the consideration of a prior conviction from another state
which would
not be subject to a one-year prison term in Ne30
braska.1
Another basic challenge to a statute based on the quantity of
convictions rationale is that it fails to serve either the purposes of
deterrence or protection of the public from truly dangerous or professional offenders. 131 Relying on the data from empirical studies,
127. S. RUBIN, supra note 1, at 466. Rubin notes that recidivism rates are higher in
the late teens and early twenties but that criminality and seriousness of
crimes declines with advancing age. However, those individuals whose recidivist tendencies have disappeared and who are no longer a dangerous threat
to society may not be released until they have served their minimum sentence. Id.
Admittedly, the relevance of the factors discussed in text accompanying
notes 123-26 supra, depends on the basic underlying purpose of the habitual
criminal statute. It could be argued that some of the factors may not be relevant to an habitual offender law which defines an habitual criminal as one
who repeats crime, and is only intended to punish the repetition of criminal
conduct. However, as it has been argued throughout this note, section 29-2221
should not be viewed as such a statute because it does not provide enhancement for second offenders; invocation of the statute is discretionary and
rarely undertaken; the language of the statute requires imprisonments, not
just convictions, for one to be considered an habitual criminal; and the penalty under the statute is potentially more severe than under strictly repeat
offender statutes.
A different definitional perspective of an habitual criminal is provided by
N. MORRIS, THE HABrruAL CRIMINAL 8 (1951) (emphasis omitted):
[An 'habitual criminal' is 'one who possesses criminal qualities inherent or latent in his mental constitution (but who is not insane or
mentally deficient); who has manifested a settled practice in crime;
and who presents a danger to the society in which he lives (but is not
merely a prostitute, vagrant, habitual drunkard or habitual petty delinquent).'
128. Note, CREIGHTON L. REV., supra note 3, at 896.
129. See Note, FORDHAM L. REV., supra note 2, at 90-91.
130. Id.
131. Katkin, supra note 1, at 105; Note, FORDHAM L. REV., supra note 2, at 86.
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Katkin concluded that "both social scientists and prison administrators seem agreed that habitual offender laws operate only to isolate from society those unfortunate inadequates from whom
comparatively little need be feared. More dangerous offenders
the public truly needs to be protected seem not to be
from whom
32
affected."'
Support for this conclusion can be gleaned from a recent Douglas County, Nebraska, study which indicated that none of the three
individuals (out of eighty-two eligibles) who were sentenced
under the habitual criminal statute in 1971-72 were charged with
violent crimes (murder, manslaughter, rape, assault and battery,
and shooting with the intent to kill, wound or maim).133 One could
argue that since the maximum sentence for violent crimes could
be as long or longer than habitual criminal enhancement, society is
still being protected from truly dangerous offenders. However, the
Douglas County study surprisingly indicated that "the only
sentences which compared to the 11.66-year average sentence of
the third offense habitual criminals were the sentences received
by violent, sixth-offense defendants.' 34 The violent offenders who
had the same number of prior offenses as the habitual offenders
received average sentences that were about six-and-one-half years
less than those of the nonviolent habitual offenders.135
The rationale that extended sentences are justifiable on the basis of public protection is clearly not supported by a law that "permits a man who has twice committed a crime of violence to go free
in less time than a man who has three times committed a lesser
offense."' 36 Nevertheless, this is the potential result under a statute based only on the quantity of prior convictions.
By definition, habitual offender laws are not needed to deter serious crimes because courts currently may sentence violent offenders to lengthy prison terms without habitual offender laws; thus,
the potential for deterrence is relatively nil. 37 At most, harsh ha132. Katkin, supra note 1, at 112. See also note 2 supra. One explanation for this
conclusion is that habitual criminal statutes are used primarily by law enforcement officials against burglary and narcotics offenders when trying to
get guilty pleas and information. Klein, supra note 4, at 436. It must be noted
that the crime which subjected the defendant in Pierceto an habitual criminal charge was the delivery of a controlled substance, amphetamines. 204
Neb. at 434, 283 N.W.2d at 7.
133. Note, CREIGHTON L. REV., supra note 3, at 908-12.
134. Id. at 910. Although the Douglas County study related primarily to the effects
of prosecutors' discretion,.it must be noted that these results would not be
possible under an habitual offender statute that mandated consideration of
the violence of the crimes as one of its criteria.
135. Id. at 909.
136. Katkin, supra note 1, at 119.
137. Id. at 106.
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bitual offender laws may only have some effect in deterring "comparatively petty offenses which are not deemed to deserve, in and
of themselves, long terms of confinement.1 38 However, this would
be true only if laws like section 29-2221 were mandatorily or frequently applied. 139
Those who advocate abandoning quantity of convictions as the
sole triggering mechanism for sentence enhancement, at a minimum, suggest that the criteria for determining which offenders require an enhanced prison term should include "the dangerousness
of the act-particularly, dangerousness against the person, not the
property, of another" and "the likelihood of repetition."' 4 Factors
which may be considered relevant under the latter criteria include
"[t] he offender's age, the amount of 'good time' since 4the last felony conviction, and the number of prior convictions.' '
One attempt at this type of reform, the Model Sentencing
Act, *42 calls for the repeal of habitual offender laws, relying instead
on a dangerous offender sentencing concept. 143 Under this
scheme, only dangerous offenders may be sentenced to an extended term. 144 The question of whether or not an individual
should be given an extended sentence is to be determined by a
presentence investigation into an offender's behavior patterns,
personality, the dangerousness of his crimes, amount of time the
offender has been in detention, and his propensity toward future
crime, inter alia.145 The court, rather than the prosecutor, makes
the determination of whether the enhancement provisions will be
applied, basing its decision largely on psychiatric evidence. A defendant found to be a dangerous offender under the Act may be
sentenced to a maximum term of thirty years imprisonment; there
146
is no minimum sentence.
Another proposal for reform is embodied in the Model Penal
Code habitual offender sentencing scheme. 147 Like the Model Sen138. Id.
139. See § MI-B-2 of text infra.
140.

S. RUBIN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW, ILLUSIONS, FICTIONS, AND

MYTHS 175 (1965). For a general discussion of the problems associated with
habitual offender laws and argument for repeal or reform, see S. RUBIN, supra
note 1, at 461-66, 480-81.
141. Note, CREIGHTON L. REV., supra note 3, at 903.
142. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT, (2d
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as the MODEL SENTENCING ACT].
143. Id. at 10. See S. RUHIN, supra note 1, at 480, for a general discussion of this

portion of the Model Sentencing Act.
144. MODEL SENTENCING ACT, supra note 142, at 2.

145. See id. §§ 2, 3, 5 & accompanying comments.
146. Id. § 5.
147. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.03 (P.O.D. 1962). For discussion of this section, see S.
RuBIN, supra note 140, at 178-82; Comment, supra note 11, at 276 n.3; Note,

1980]

HABITUAL CRIMINAL ACT

tencing Act, the Model Penal Code requires that the court determine whether the enhancement provisions should apply and
generally focuses on the nature of the offense and the defendant's
potential for future criminal conduct. 148 However, the Model Penal
Code does not have a definite mechanism for a determination of or
an adequate definition of dangerousness and "does not provide for
a hearing to put any allegations or findings in issue."1 49 Thus, the
judge has more complete discretion under the Model Penal Code
than under the Model Sentencing Act. Furthermore, the Model
Penal Code retains the quantity of convictions as a triggering
mechanism for invocation of the statute independently of the dangerousness of the individual.150 Finally, the Model Penal Code employs minimum-maximum extended terms, the range and length of
which depend on the seriousness of the offense for which the defendant was most recently convicted.151 The presence of this wideranging sentencing scheme and the almost unfettered discretion of
the judge has lead critics to charge that the Model Penal Code repeat offender scheme does little to remedy, and may actually
worsen, the problem 1 52
of disparity of sentences present in traditional recidivist laws.
2. ProsecutorialDiscretion
Any utility the habitual criminal law may have in terms of satisfying the purposes of punishment, deterrence, and public protection has been virtually nullified by the fact that invocation of the
statute is within the discretion of the prosecutor' 5 3 and the fact
that the statute is rarely invoked. 5 4 Recent studies in Douglas
County, Nebraska, indicated that between 1971 and 1973 only four
of 133 individuals eligible for enhanced sentences under section 292221 were actually sentenced as habitual offenders. 55 FurtherFORDHAm L. REV., supra note 3, at 90 n.120; Note, TOL. L. REV., supra note 3, at

611.
148. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 147, § 7.03.
149. S. RuBIN, supra note 140, at 180.
150. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 147, § 7.03; See S. RuBIN, supra note 140, at
179.
151. S. RumN, supra note 140, at 179.
152. Id. at 182. For a brief discussion of another recent proposal for reform, the
Model Sentencing and Corrections Act, see note 121 supra.
153. See notes 3, 8 & accompanying text supra.
154. Note, CREIGHTON L. REV., supra note 3, at 906. Only three of 82 qualifying
individuals were sentenced as habitual criminals in 1971 and 1972, and only
one of 51 qualifying individuals in 1973 in Douglas County, Nebraska. Id. at
906 & n.49. Evidence in State v. Bird Head, 204 Neb. 807, 812, 285 N.W.2d 698,
702 (1979) indicated that between 1971 and 1977, eight of 26 eligible individuals were charged as habitual criminals in Sheridan County, Nebraska.
155. Note, CREIGHTON L REV., supra note 3, at 906 & n.49.
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more, "[n] o clear correlation was indicated between receipt of an
prior rechabitual criminal sentence and a defendant's age, race,
156
ord, current offense or frequency of criminal activity."
In light of those findings, it can hardly be argued the habitual
criminal statute serves a purpose of protecting the public from
even relatively minor offenders, much less individuals who commit
violent crimes. Realistically, the potential that a seldom-used statute will have a deterrent effect seems highly questionable. 157 Furthermore, even the rationale that the statute provides retribution
for the repetition of crime, the justification primarily relied upon
by the court in Pierce,158 is destroyed by these findings. Instead,
the habitual criminal statute currently creates unjustified disparities in the treatment of individuals.
Not only does it appear that section 29-2221 is being applied arbitrarily, 5 9 but judicial discretion in sentencing has apparently not
compensated for the sentencing disparity between eligible individuals charged as habitual offenders and those not charged.
"Sentences given to defendants with two prior convictions who
were sentenced as habitual criminals were seven-and-one-half
years longer than sentences imposed upon other defendants with
two prior felonies."'160 Finally, even if the threat or the invocation
of section 29-2221 can be seen as serving the purpose of obtaining
information and guilty pleas, 16 1 the use of the statute in this manner must be seen as inconsistent with the goals of punishment and
the protection of society, as well as a source of unconscionable disparity in the treatment of offenders.
The direction that reform in this area might take seems to depend on what the legislature views as the fundamental purpose of
the recidivist statutes. If the goal of the statute is to protect society from truly dangerous offenders, an appropriate statutory
scheme might be one similar to the Model Sentencing Act, under
which the determination of whether to apply sentence enhancement is in the hands of the trial judge, limited by certain standards. 162 It has also been suggested that similar reform might be
accomplished by "providing express standards for prosecutors and
by mandating a limited judicial review of their decisions"'163 con156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 912. See also notes 133-35 & accompanying text supra.
Comment, supra note 11, at 299.
204 Neb. at 441, 283 N.W.2d at 11 (1979).
Note, CREIGHTON L. REV., supra note 3, at 918. See also note 156 & accompanying text supra.
Note, CREIGHTON L. REV., supra note 3, at 912.
See note 4 & accompanying text supra.
See generally notes 142-46 & accompanying text supra.
Comment, supra note 11, at 315. See also id. at 312-13. But see United States
v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965) ("as an
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cerning invocation of the habitual criminal statute. At least under
those schemes there is a requirement for a rational and supportable basis for the disparity of treatment of individuals committing
the same number of offenses.
If the primary purpose of the statute is to punish the repetition
of all crimes, thereby providing broader deterrence and social protection, it could be asserted that the invocation of the statute
should be made mandatory upon each subsequent felony conviction. If nothing else, this would eliminate the disparity of treatment between individuals who have been convicted, sentenced,
and imprisoned an equal number of times. However, it has been
noted that such a change should be accompanied by a reduction or
elimination of the ten-year minimum mandatory sentence and the
sixty-year maximum sentence in order to ameliorate the unfair164
ness that results from grossly disproportionate sentences.
3. The Ten to Sixty-Year Sentencing Scheme
Inequity and unfairness in sentencing can stem from the requirement in section 29-2221 that, upon being found to be an habitual criminal, an individual must be sentenced to a minimum of ten
years imprisonment and may be sentenced to a maximum of sixty
years. 165 Katkin, citing State v. Sedalecek,166 characterized these
types of statutes as being indefensibly harsh by allowing or mandating the imposition of sentences that are completely disproporincident of the constitutional separation of powers... courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of attorneys of the
United States in their control over criminal prosecutions").
164. Comment, supra note 11, at 315. For an example of a statute that contains a
potentially less severe minimum sentence, see note 105 supra. However, it
must be noted that making the application of a recividist statute mandatory
upon the conviction of a defendant for a subsequent felony may not cure the
disparity of treatment of individuals under the current statute, and may actually result in less protection for the public. This is because the prosecutor
still would have to file felony charges against a defendant for his latest offense in order to trigger the habitual offender law. A prosecutor engaged in
bargaining with the defendant might have to agree to file misdemeanor
charges against the offender in order to obtain a guilty plea or information.
"Such a practice actually undermines the safety of the public by working to
the advantage of organized and professional thieves." Katkin, supra note 1,
at 109.
165. NEB. REV.STAT. § 29-2221 (Reissue 1975). See S. RuBm, supra note 1, at 46263; Katkin, supra note 1, at 117.
166. 178 Neb. 322, 133 N.W.2d 380 (1965) (sentencing a 64-year-old defendant with
two prior offenses to 14 years for stealing a $20 to $25 shotgun from his neighbor). Another example of an arguably harsh sentence is State v. Silvacarrvalho, 193 Neb. 447, 227 N.W.2d 602 (1975) (defendant convicted of
burglarizing an unoccupied commercial building, taking a few dollars change
and a pocket knife was sentenced to 12 to 15 years).
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tionate to the specific offense which "triggers" them. 167
Furthermore, it may well be that an individual who has served
two independent terms of imprisonment for his two previous
crimes 16 8 has manifested a resistence to the corrections system
and demonstrated sufficient persistence in crime to justify an enhanced sentence for a third offense. "However, 'it defies all sense
of just proportion to suggest that the limit for a second offender
should be two years and for a third offender twenty five.' 169 Similarly, there is little equitable appeal in a statutory program that
does not have a minimum penalty for second offenders, 170 but requires that a third offender be sentenced to a minimum term of ten
years imprisonment for the very same offense.' 7 ' This type of disproportionate punishment is vividly demonstrated in the Pierce
case. The defendant's twelve year sentence for delivery of amphetamines as a third offense was at least twelve times as long as
the minimum penalty and almost two-and-one-half times the maximum penalty he could have received for the same crime were it
172
only his second offense.
Finally, the unfairness of a statutory sentencing scheme which
would allow an individual who has been twice convicted of a violent crime to serve less time than an individual who has been convicted of three lesser offenses cannot be denied. Yet' this is not
only a possibility, 17 3 but apparently a reality under Nebraska
law.174
167. Katkin, supra note 1, at 117. Arguably, Pierce's sentence of 12 years for delivery of $65 worth of amphetamines could be characterized as harsh.
168. It should be noted that under Pierce only two previous convictions would be
necessary. 204 Neb. at 443, 282 N.W.2d at 11.
169. Katkin, supra note 1, at 118 (citation omitted). (Under Nebraska law these
limits would be five and 60 years. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-4,125 (Reissue 1975)
(current version at id. § 28-416 (Cum. Supp. 1978)); id. § 29-2221 (Reissue
1975)).
170. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-4,125 (Reissue 1975) (current version at id. § 28-416
(Cum. Supp. 1978)) (allowing a penalty of imprisonment up to six months in
county jail or a fine of up to $2,000).
171. Id. § 29-2221 (Reissue 1975).
172. See id. § 28-4,125 (Reissue 1975) (current version at id. § 28-416 (Cum. Supp.
1978)).
173. Penalties for some violent crimes under Nebraska law are potentially less
severe than the 10 year minimum mandatory sentence under section 29-2221.
See, e.g., id. § 28-305 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (manslaughter-one to 20 years);
§ 28-308 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (first degree assault-one to 20 years); § 28-309
(Cum. Supp. 1978) (second degree assault-maximum five years, no minimum).
174. See generally Note, CREIGHTON L. REV., supra note 3, at 908-12; notes 133-35 &
accompanying text supra. This study shows that sentences imposed on violent offenders who had not been charged under section 29-2221 were shorter
than the 10-year minimum sentence under that statute and were about sixand-one-half years shorter than the 11.66-year sentence for those defendants
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Assuming that the legislature does want to use the habitual
criminal law to strictly punish individuals for the repetition of any
criminal conduct, it may be more just and rational to abandon the
mandatory ten to sixty-year sentencing scheme in favor of a
scheme which imposes sentences that are a multiple of the maximum sentence that could be imposed for the subsequent offense
that triggers the application of the recidivist statute. 17 5 Another
alternative would be to devise a schedule "providing extensions of
various lengths which are directly proportionate to the immediate
offense.' 7 6 Either of these schemes would serve to mitigate the
disproportionately harsh treatment that relatively minor offenders
now receive and would provide lengthier sentences for those individuals whose most recent crime indicates that they do represent a
serious threat to the public.
IV. CONCLUSION
The majority of jurisdictions appear to adhere to the position
that in order for crimes to be counted toward habitual criminal
sentence enhancement, the commission of each subsequent felony
must follow the conviction on a prior felony. 77 Although this proposition has been explicitly incorporated in the statutes of some jurisdictions, 7 8 it has been reached through judicial interpretation
in others. Of particular note are those cases which interpreted
recividist statutes that were similar to Nebraska's section 292221.179

The contrary position taken by the majority justices of the Nebraska court in Pierce may be attributable in general to a lack of
in-depth consideration of: (1) principles of statutory construction,
(2) the purposes of the statute in light of its language and mechanics viewed as a whole, and (3) concepts of equity and social policy.

175.

176.
177.
178.
179.

convicted of nonviolent crimes but against whom the habitual criminal statute was used, even though all defendants had committed the same number of
offenses. Note, CREIGHTON L. REV., supra note 3, at 908-12.
Katkin, supra note 1, at 119. For an example of a scheme similar to this, see
MIcH. Com. LAws ANN. §§ 769.10 to .12 (Supp. 1979) which provide generally
that a second felony conviction is punishable by a maximum prison term two
times the maximum sentence for a first conviction of that offense; a third felony conviction is punishable by a maximum sentence twice the length of the
sentence for a first conviction of that offense; a fourth felony conviction may
be punished by a life sentence if the felony would be punishable upon first
conviction for that offense by a maximum term of five years or more.
Katkin, supra note 1, at 119.
See note 30 & accompanying text supra.
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080 (Baldwin Supp. 1979); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 15-529.1 (West 1967) (amended 1978).
See notes 82-88 & accompanying text supra. These cases are cited by the
Pierce dissent. 204 Neb. at 444, 283 N.W.2d at 12.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:507

In addition, it has been argued that the Pierce majority cited and
relied on decisions from jurisdictions with substantially distinterms of the mechanics of operguishable habitual offender laws in
180
ation and harshness of penalties.
The defects and unfairness of Pierce, as well as the habitual
criminal statute, cannot be cured merely by a legislative change
which provides that in order to apply habitual criminal sentence
enhancement, each subsequent felony must be committed after
the conviction, sentencing and imprisonment for the prior felony.
While such reform might help to eliminate the disparity of treatment of individuals who have had the same number of opportunities to respond to correction and may serve as a somewhat more
adequate indicator of habitual criminality, it fails to address other
inadequancies and inequities inherent in section 29-2221.181 These
include: failure to adequately define habitual criminality; extreme
and irrational disparity of treatment of individuals generally; disproportionately harsh punishment relative to the nature of the offense; failure to protect society from and deter dangerous or
nondangerous offenders; and failure to provide retribution for the
repetition of criminal conduct.
Reconsideration of the necessity for and re-definition of the
goals of the habitual offender statute must be undertaken. Three
characteristics of the statute must be given specific attention: (1)
the use of numerical counts of crime as the sole criteria for the
determination of habitual criminal status, (2) the discretionary
and infrequent use of the statute by prosecutors, and (3) the
mandatory ten to sixty-year sentencing provision. It is suggested
that with the specific goals of the recidivist statute clearly defined,
the legislature can create a statute which at least approaches the
achievement of the goals with less disparity of treatment and
harshness than that resulting from the current law.
However, in view of the complexity and extent of the problems
inherent in any habitual criminal statute, one might well conclude
that the repeal of the statute would be the better course of action. 182 It could be argued the state would lose nothing by the repeal of section 29-2221, because crime can still be "repressed by
penalties of just proportion set by a judge utilizing his discretion. '' 183 Furthermore, repeal is the only way to cure what may be
180. See generally § UI-A-3 of text supra.
181. It has been argued that L.B. 799, introduced to amend section 29-2221 in response to the Pierce decision, is also inadequate and inappropriate. For a
brief discussion of L.B. 799, see note 121 supra.
182. See S. RuBrN, supra note 1, at 464; Note, CREIGHTON L. REV., supra note 3, at
918.
183. Note, CREIGHTON L. REV., upra note 3, at 918.

1980]

HABITUAL CRIMINAL ACT

the fundamental injustice pervading habitual criminal statutes184
the punishment of a person for a status rather than for a crime.
Charles W. Sorenson, Jr. '81

184. See State v. Losieau, 184 Neb. 178, 181, 166 N.W.2d 406, 408 (1969) (citations
omitted);" 'Habitual criminality' is, under the habitual criminal law, a status
rather than a crime. .. ."
It has been held that one can not be criminally punished for the status of
narcotic addiction, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), and it has been
suggested that it would be cruel to inflict sentence enhancement for the repetition of criminal conduct that is attributable to a defendant's addiction. In re
Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974). It is submitted that
the status of habitual criminality might well be viewed analogously.

